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Some courts say the manufacture of impure foods makes the manufac-
turer prima facie negligent. Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 269 Pa. 114, 145 At. 700 (1929); Campbell Soup Co.
v. Davis, 207 N.C. 256, 175 S.E. 743 (1934). Others call a proper
case for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Collins Baking
Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336 (933); Gainesville Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart, 5 1 Ga. App. Io2, 179 S.E. 734 (i935);
contra, Enloe v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 18o S.E. 582
(1935). Although these aids favor the injured parties, they are not
adequate for full protection. The manufacturer still avoids the liability
by rebutting the presumptions. This he is unable to do when sued upon
implied warranty in the states where a contractual relationship is not
required. The risk is thus placed upon the person best able to avoid the
injury-the manufacturer.
The dictum in the Canton Provision case, supra, must not be under-
estimated, for the Supreme Court overruled the appellate court which
expressly held the Provision Co. liable upon the authority of the Triz-
zino case, supra. One cannot deny that the Trizzino case is in step with
the advance of the modern economic and manufacturing world of today
and should be supported. The Supreme Court of Ohio should seriously
consider such contentions when called upon to decide the merits of the
dictum in the Canton Provision Co. case, requiring privity of contract
between consumer and manufacturer of unwholesome food and the
Trizzino case dispensing with such requirement.
HARRY A. GOLDMAN
TORTS
VIOLATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS BY MOTORCYCLE
POLICEMAN - NEGLIGENCE PER SE - EXPRESS AND IM-
PLIED EXEMPTION
Plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman in the city of Toledo, while in
pursuit of a violator of the speed laws was injured in a collision with
the defendant's automobile. Plaintiff was operating his cycle at the
speed of 65 miles per hour and crashed into the defendant when the
latter made a left-hand turn at an intersection without signalling, as
required by a city ordinance. The court charged the jury that if the
plaintiff were found to be exceeding the speed limit prescribed by Ohio
General Code, Section 12603 and Ordinance 4034 of the City of
Toledo, Section 45, relating to speed limits, such violation constituted
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negligence per se and barred his recovery. Judges Zimmerman and
Day dissented. Swaboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 2 0.0. 5i6,
196 N.E. 274 (1935)-
In the case of Keevil v. Ponsford (Tex. Civ. App.), 173 S.W.
518 (1915), the court, in holding against recovery in a similar case,
stated that where no specific exemption had been provided for in the
statute, the courts could not engraft one; but that it must be done by
the legislative body. To provide against the result reached in this and
the principal case, traffic regulations frequently provide in express terms
that both fire and police department vehicles shall be exempt from speed
limits imposed upon other motor vehicles. In some instances such a
provision has been made by statute: Hampton v. Joyce (Tex. Civ.
App.), 8o S.W. (2nd.) io66 (1935); Heimer v. Salisbury, io8 Conn.
i8o, 142 A. 749 (1928); Byers v. Spicer iI6 Cal. 219, 2 P. (2nd)
479 (1931); Swift v. Payne, 223 Ala. 25, 134 So. 626 (i93i);
Dowler v. Johnston, 225 N.Y. 39, 121 N.E. 487, 3 A.L.R. 146
(1918). In other cases embodied in an ordinance: Vandel v. Saunders,
85 N.H. 143, 155 A. 193 (193i); Clark v. Wilson, io8 Wash. 127,
183 P. 103 (i919); Miner v. Rembt, 164 N.Y.S. 945, 178 App. Div.
173 (1917); Hubert v. Granzow, 131 Minn. 361, 155 N.W. 204,
Ann. Cas. 191 7 D, 563 (1915); Ex parte Snowden, x2 Cal. App. 521,
107 Pac. 724 (19io). An ordinance adopting speed regulations is not
invalid because it exempts such vehicles from its operation. Ex parte
Snowden, supra. The exemption of such vehicles, when in the exercise
of duty, is applicable only under such circumstances, and not when in
use on the street for any other purpose, as where a policeman is on his
way home to lunch, Swift v. Payne, supra; or going to investigate a
civil accident, Spencer v. Schiffman, i19 Cal. App. 746, 7 P. (2nd)
361 (1932); or a fireman testing a fire truck, Opocensky v. South
Omaha, io Neb. 336, 163 N.W. 325, L.R.A. 1917E, 1170 (917);
or on a tour of inspection of fire houses, Dowler v. Johnston, supra.
Considerable difficulty arises, however, as to the applicability of
regulations of the character under consideration to public officials, and
the apparatus under their control, where no express exemption is con-
tained in the act. Apart from any express grant of privilege in these
respects, it is usually considered, by reason of the necessities of the situa-
tion and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, that
policemen are, when enforcing the law, exempt from traffic regulations
such as those fixing the speed limit. Lilly v. W. Va., 29 Fed. (2nd) 61,
64 C.C.A. 4 (1928); Koger v. Keller, 12o Kans., 196, 342 P. 294
(1926); Hogle v. City of Minneapolis, 193 Minn. 326, 258 N.W.
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721 (935); Edberg v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 395, 184 N.W. 12, 21
N.C.C.A. 871 (1921); State v. Gorham, no Wash. 330, I88 P.
457, 9 A.L.R. 365 (1920); Crosby v. Donaldson, 95 Fla. 365, 116
So. 231 (1928). Some jurisdictions are to be found, however, which,
in accord with the principal case, have held against such implied exemp-
tion. Keevil v. Ponsford, supra (since changed by statute); Foster v.
Bauer, 173 Wisc. 231, i8o N.W. 817 (1921); Hudson v. Carton,
37 Ga. App. 634, I4I S.W. 222 (1928). Some courts have held that
although it may be lawful for a police officer to travel at a speed in
excess of the limit fixed for general traffic, he is not thereby relieved of
the duty of exercising due care in the operation of his motor vehicle,
Brown v. Wilmington, 27 Del. 492, 90 A. 44 (914); Edberg v.
Johnson, supra. The standard is such care as a prudent man would
exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature, under like
circumstances, Edberg v. Johnson, supra; Brown v. Wilmington, supra.
Without express exemption, firemen, too, have been excluded from the
operation of the speed regulations, Toledo Ry. & Light Co. v. Ward,
Admx., 2 Ohio C.C. (NS) 256, 15 C.D. 399 (903), which was
overruled by the principal case; Balthaser v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
187 Cal. 302, 202 P. 37, i9 A.L.R. 452; Kansas City v. MDonal,
6o Kans. 481, 57 P. 123, 45 L.R.A. 429, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 67
(1899); Goeres v. Goeres, 124 Neb. 720, 248 N.W. 75 (I933);
McCarthy v. Mason, 171 A. 256, (Me., 1934). The fact, though,
that a fire department is either expressly or impliedly exempt from the
operation of traffic regulations does not relieve the operator of such
vehicle from the same general duty of exercising due care even in
answering emergency calls, Farrell v. Fire Ins. Salvage Co., 189 App.
Div. 795, 179 N.Y.S. 477 (i919), although in determining what is
due care on the part of the operator of such vehicle, his right to assume
that others will recognize and respect his superior rights on the street is
an element to be taken into consideration. Warren v. Mendenhall,
77 Minn. 145, 79 N.W. 661 (i899).
Not only have the courts interpreted the motor vehicle laws to
exclude from their operation police and firemen, but in State v. Burton,
41 R.I. 303, L.R.A. I 9 x8F 559, 103 A. 962 (i918), it was held
that a member of the United States Naval Reserve Force, on duty as a
dispatch driver, was not amenable to the laws of the state while on his
way to deliver a message, at the command of his superior officer, which
that officer deemed urgent. The case rested on the principle of public
necessity and convenience. It has been considered, too, that an implied
exception to the requirements of traffic regulations exists in favor of
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ambulances in emergency cases. Boggs v. Jewel Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428,
S09 A. 666 (1920); Syck v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 118, 177
N.W. 944 (1920), dictum.
The conflict in those states where there is no provision for exemp-
tion seems to be based on whether the letter of the statute, rather than
its spirit, is to control. Judge Zimmerman predicated his dissent in the
principal case on the fact that it is hardly reasonable that a legislative
body, in passing a statute or ordinance designed to suppress reckless
driving, intended to restrict officers in the speed they might find neces-
sary to use in arresting a violator of such statute or ordinance. He stated
that a motorcycle policeman would be seriously handicapped in the
performance of his duty to arrest speed violators, if he were held to an
observance of speed and other traffic regulations, and if his violations
thereof were to be denoted as negligence. In Edberg v. Johnson, supra,
the court stated: "It would be an affront to the intelligence of the
legislature to hold that, in enacting a statute designed to stop speeding,
it intended to restrict peace officers to the prescribed speed limits when in
pursuit of violators of the statute." The decision in the principal case,
based on the strict letter of the statute, seems contrary to public conveni-
ence and necessity. But so long as the Ohio Courts adhere to their
present position, the easiest way out of the situation seems to lie in amend-
ing the appropriate statutes and ordinances to provide for the exemption
sought.
HARRY L. BROWN
VIOLATION OF STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE - PRoxI-
MATE CAUSE
The wagon of plaintiff's decedent was backed up to a platform of a
cider mill on the north side of the highway in such a manner that the
horses were standing on the highway with their heads and feet at or
near the north curb line. It was at night and decedent's wagon had no
lights. However, the highway was illuminated by lights of the cider
mill. Defendant, proceeding westerly, negligently ran into the lead
horse knocking him on the decedent who received injuries from which
he later died. Held: that it was a question for the jury whether deced-
ent's negligence, if any, was a contributory cause of the injury. Miller
v. Trummer, ddmx., 50 Ohio App. 446, 198 N.E. 492, 2 Ohio Op.
I S, 19 Abs. 130, Ohio Bar (Nov. 25, 1935).
Section 12614-3 of Motor Vehicles Chapter provides, "It shall be
the duty of every person who operates, drives, or has upon any . . .
